Suchergebnisse

Article 356 of the Indian Constitution has often been subjected to the partisan use by the successive Central governments since 1950. However, the shift from a single-party majority government to a multi-party coalition governments in national politics since early 1990s has largely influenced the scope and intent of invoking this Article. The coalition government's survival with the backing of regional parties has indeed been a major factor in diminishing the incentives for the arbitrary and frequent invocation of Article 356. In this backdrop, the present article explains how the political change brought about by the coalition governments since 1990s has created the conditions for restraining Central transgressions on state governance, and also discusses the prospects of rationally employing this Article in the changing political conditions of the country. The argument of this paper is that—although the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party to national political dominance since the 2014 general elections has raised apprehension about the move towards centralised federalism, it is not likely to upset the current pattern of restrained use of this Article.